Fifth Circuit Rehearing of Gun Possession Case Puts Federal Commerce Clause Powers Under Scrutiny

A violent altercation that erupted on the streets of New Orleans has evolved into a major constitutional battle before the federal judiciary. The case, now before the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, could significantly alter the balance of power between federal authorities and the states by challenging how Congress utilizes the Commerce Clause to enact criminal statutes.

The dispute originated on a Thursday afternoon in February 2024, when gunfire broke out along the 3000 block of Law Street, in close proximity to the Law Street Baptist Church. Responding officers were met with reports from neighborhood witnesses who described hearing dozens of rounds fired during an intense street melee. The violence left one woman suffering from a gunshot wound to the leg and another woman injured by a stabbing.

Following an investigation into the disturbance, law enforcement officials announced two weeks later that three suspects had been taken into custody. Among those arrested was Curtis Squire, whom local authorities initially charged with attempted second-degree murder in connection with the chaotic neighborhood shootout.

The local state charges against Squire soon fell apart under forensic examination. Ballistic analyses conducted on the Glock handgun recovered from Squire’s residence demonstrated that the weapon did not match the firearm discharged during the Law Street brawl. Consequently, local prosecutors dropped the attempted murder accusation against him.

Despite the dismissal of the local violent crime charges, federal prosecutors stepped in to pursue Squire. Because he had a previous felony conviction on his record for heroin distribution, federal law prohibited him from possessing any firearms. Squire was subsequently indicted under Title 18, Section 922(g)(1) of the United States Code, which makes it a federal crime for individuals with felony records to possess a firearm.

Faced with the federal indictment, Squire opted to enter a guilty plea while explicitly reserving his legal right to challenge the conviction on appeal. A federal judge then handed down a prison sentence that ordered Squire to serve more than four years in federal custody.

Squire launched his appellate fight before the 5th Circuit by initially claiming that the federal ban on firearm possession by individuals with felony records infringed upon his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. However, a three-judge appellate panel reviewed his arguments and formally rejected his Second Amendment claims in June.

Undeterred by the panel's ruling, Squire petitioned the full 5th Circuit bench for an en banc rehearing. In his renewed appeal, Squire significantly expanded the scope of his legal attack, raising a structural constitutional question that extends well beyond whether a drug conviction justifies the loss of Second Amendment protections.

At the core of Squire's en banc petition is the argument that Congress lacked the constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to enact Section 922(g)(1) in the first place. Squire contends that the federal statute unlawfully criminalizes behavior that is purely intrastate and noncommercial in nature, operating under the pretext of regulating interstate commerce.

The potential breadth of Squire's constitutional challenge prompted a sharp warning from within the appellate court itself. When the 5th Circuit granted the petition to rehear the case en banc in July, Judge Stephen Higginson warned that adopting Squire’s constitutional position would have massive import for federal law and could undermine substantial portions of the United States Code.

While Judge Higginson voiced deep concern over the disruptive legal ramifications, critics of expansive federal power have long argued that the Commerce Clause has been stretched far beyond its original constitutional boundaries. These critics contend that the provision has effectively been transformed into an unlimited general police power, eroding the foundational doctrine that the federal government possesses only enumerated powers explicitly granted by the Constitution.

The Firearms Policy Coalition entered the fray by filing an amicus curiae brief in support of Squire’s rehearing petition. The advocacy group argued that during the Founding era, the term "commerce" had a specific and restricted definition that encompassed trade, meaning the buying, selling, and bartering of goods, as well as the transportation required for those commercial transactions.

According to the group's legal filing, even modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence cannot reasonably support the legal theory behind Section 922(g)(1). The organization maintained that applying federal commerce authority to the mere noncommercial possession of a firearm within a single state strays too far from constitutional limits.

The statutory history of the ban dates back to 1968, when Congress passed the Gun Control Act. That legislation applied to individuals convicted of offenses carrying penalties of more than a year of incarceration, prohibiting them from receiving any firearm or ammunition that had previously been shipped or transported across state or international lines.

That same year, lawmakers enacted a similar restriction within the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, barring any convicted felon from receiving, possessing, or transporting firearms in commerce or affecting commerce. The reach of this statutory language was later addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1977 decision in *Scarborough v. United States*.

In *Scarborough*, the Supreme Court held that the government could satisfy the required statutory link to commerce merely by demonstrating that a possessed firearm had, at some point in its existence, crossed state lines. However, legal observers note that the *Scarborough* decision only resolved the statutory interpretation of the legislative text and stopped short of definitively settling whether Congress had the underlying constitutional power under the Commerce Clause to enforce such a broad restriction. As the en banc 5th Circuit prepares to reconsider the issue, Squire's appeal could redefine the boundaries of federal criminal authority.